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1998 SURVEY OF ETHICS IN
LAND-USE PLANNING
Patricia E. Salkin*
Introduction
The activities currently taking place in Washington, D.C. remind
the American public of the importance of public sector ethics.
From the appointment of an independent counsel to unprece-
dented decisions by the federal courts,' it is clear there is height-
ened media and citizen attention to questions related to ethics.
Despite the sensationalism with which they are often handled,
these scandals involving public officials actually help to open the
door for greater governmental scrutiny and reform efforts.2
Meanwhile, what happens on the national scene clearly has im-
plications for activities at the local government level, including sit-
uations surrounding land-use planning and zoning decision-
making. This impact is evident by the increase in the number of
land-use ethics cases reported in 1998.3 When considering the
range of ethics issues that may confront land-use lawyers,4 it is no
surprise that 1998 yielded a number of reported decisions and pub-
lished opinions from across the country. The issues these opinions
address can be divided into several major categories: 1) conflicts of
interest, 2) compatibility of office, 3) bias and prejudgment and 4)
miscellaneous.
* Associate Dean and Director, Government Law Center of Albany Law
School.
1. See, e.g., In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1998); In re Grand Jury Sub-
poena Duces Tecum, 122 F.3d 910 (8h Cir. 1997).
2. See JOSEPH ZIMMERMAN, CURBING UNETHICAL BEHAVIOR IN GOVERNMENT
(1994).
3. This author conducted a similar survey last year that included a review of all
land-use ethics cases and opinions in the 1990s. See Patricia E. Salkin, Legal Ethics
and Land-Use Planning, 30 URB. LAW. 383 (1998), reprinted in MATTHEW BENDER,
THE TWENTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON PLANNING, ZONING, AND EMINENT
DOMAIN (1998).
4. Arising issues include questions of professional ethics under professional
codes of responsibility, local and state ethics laws and judicial decrees that bear on the
moral conduct of public sector attorneys. See id.
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II.. Conflicts of Interest
The amount at stake, from both a financial standpoint and a
quality of life perspective, when planning and zoning boards make
land-use decisions places these actions under increased scrutiny, in-
cluding an intensive search for possible violations of ethical stan-
dards.5 Conflicts of interest cases most often arise where there is
potential of financial gain for oneself, a family member or a busi-
ness associate.
A. Personal Financial Gain
Several 1998 cases illustrate how individuals perceive the use of
land-use decisionmaking to personally profit. For example, a Cali-
fornia citizen challenged a zoning board's development decision,
claiming that a board member owned real property in the vicinity
of where the proposed project was to be located.6 Although the
court decided the case on procedural grounds - that the longer
statute of limitations under the California Political Reform Act7
did not apply to an appeal of a zoning decision - the litigation
illustrates the type of ethics-related allegations that may be em-
ployed to overturn an unpopular decision.8
Similarly, a Connecticut appellate court upheld a challenge by
abutting property owners to a zoning commission's decision to
grant a permit allowing a skeet shooting range on a sporting club's
property. The court rationalized that an ex officio member of the
commission failed to disqualify himself from the proceedings. 9
Connecticut statutes specifically prohibit member participation on
zoning boards when a direct or indirect conflict of interest exists,
stating that "No member of any zoning commission or board...
shall participate in the hearing or decision of the board or commis-
sion of which he is a member upon any matter in which he is di-
rectly or indirectly interested in a personal or financial sense."'10
5. See Patricia E. Salkin, Ethics and the Land-Use Lawyer, 5 LAND-USE L. &
ZONING DIG. 3 (1997).
6. See Ching v. San Francisco Bd. of Permit Appeals, 60 Cal. App. 4th 888 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
7. The Political Reform Act provides that, "No public official at any level of state
or local government shall make, participate in making or in any way attempt to use
his official position to influence a governmental decision in which he knows or has
reason to know he has a financial interest." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 87100 (West 1993).
8. See Ching, 60 Cal. App. 4th at 888.
9. See Nazarko v. Conservation Comm'n, 717 A.2d 850 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998).
10. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-11 (1989). With respect to conservation commissions,
Connecticut legislation provides, in part, that: "[n]o member or alternate member of
such board or commission shall participate in the hearing or decision of such board or
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Although the relevant statute did not specifically mandate applica-
tion to ex officio members of commissions, the court resolved the
ambiguity in adopting the "more reasonable construction" of the
statute and "repeatedly emphasized that '[n]eutrality and imparti-
ality of members are essential to the fair and proper operation of
* . .[zoning] authorities.""' Further, while the ex officio member
of the commission only attended two of the three hearings and did
not participate in the voting, the court concluded his mere presence
constituted a prohibited conflict of interest because he held a mem-
bership in the sporting club and owned the only gun shop in
town.
12
In another 1998 Connecticut case, a plaintiff, after being denied
site plan approval by the zoning commission, argued the decision
should be null and void based on alleged conflict of interest and
predisposition of certain board members.' 3 In this situation, a
board member owned a campground across the street from the
plaintiff's proposed bituminous concrete manufacturing site. The
member questioned the legality of the proposed use under the zon-
ing code, initiated conversations regarding such with the town
planner and the town attorney, procured an engineering firm to
review the application and participated in one meeting. Despite
these zealous efforts, the member later withdrew from the commis-
sion and did not personally participate in the hearing on the site
plan application.' 4 The court found nothing in the statute that pro-
hibits a member not participating in a matter from presenting their
own view on the subject.' 5 Accordingly, the court concluded that
commission of which he is a member upon any matter in which he is directly or indi-
rectly interested in a personal or financial sense." Id. § 22(a)-42(c) (1995).
11. Nazarko, 717 A.2d at 852 (quoting Fletcher v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n,
264 A.2d 566, 571 (1969)).
12. See id. The court reiterated that "[t]he decision as to whether a particular
interest is sufficient to disqualify is necessarily a factual one and depends on the cir-
cumstances of the particular case." Id. at 853 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 8-11, 8-21).
The court also noted "the appearance of impropriety created by a public official's
participation in a matter in which he has a pecuniary or personal interest in is suffi-
cient to require disqualification ..." Id. at 852. "Public policy requires that members
of public boards cannot be permitted to place themselves in a position in which per-
sonal interest may conflict with public duty." Id. at 853 (citing Zeigler v. Thomaston,
654 A.2d 392, 397 (Conn. Super. 1994)).
13. See Phillips v. Town of Salem Planning & Zoning Comm'n, No. 113120, 1998
WL 258332 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1998).
14. See id. at *2. She was, however, represented by counsel at the hearing on the
matter.
15. See id. at *10 (citing Massimo v. Planning Comm'n, 564 A.2d 1075-76 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1989)).
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although the board member had a direct personal, and possibly fi-
nancial, conflict of interest, she did not violate the statutory provi-
sions because she withdrew from the board on the matter. 16
B. Family Relationships
Cases from 1998 also show that the public is concerned that indi-
viduals use zoning decisionmaking to assist financial prospects of
close family members. Two New Jersey cases involved alleged con-
flicts of interest based on familial relationships, yet the courts
reached opposite conclusions based upon the facts therein. Both
cases involved benefits of a proposed siting to a board member's
elderly parents.' 7 In one case, plaintiffs alleged that a board mem-
ber could not remain impartial in considering a site application be-
cause he would personally benefit from the proposed supermarket
construction. The alleged benefit was that the board member
would no longer have to assist in or complete his parent's grocery
shopping because the new supermarket would be located closer to
where his elderly parents live. Furthermore, plaintiffs argued there
was a conflict of interest because his parents signed a petition that
was presented to the board in favor of the proposed store. 18 The
board member argued that his parents did their own shopping and
that he saw them briefly only once or twice a week. The court
found no conflict of interest nor any appearance of impropriety,
concluding that these facts did not indicate that the member was
conflicted by desires of aiding himself or his parents on one hand
and serving the needs of the Cranford community on the other.19
In a second case, the court invalidated the board's variance and
site plan approval for a supermarket because a member's eighty-
three year old mother owned a commercial enterprise within fifty
feet of the proponent's property.20 The ownership constituted a
16. See id. at *11.
17. See Lincoln Heights Ass'n v. Township of Cranford Planning Bd., 714 A.2d
995 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1998); Ex. rel. Tenafly, Inc. v. Tenafly Zoning Bd. of
Adjustment, 704 A.2d 1032 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998).
18. See Lincoln Heights, 714 A.2d at 998.
19. See id. The court stated:
Local governments would be seriously handicapped if every possible inter-
est, no matter how remote and speculative, would serve as a disqualification
of an official. If this were so, it would discourage capable men and women
from holding public office .... The determinations of municipal officials
should not be approached with a general feeling of suspicion, for as Justice
Holmes has said, "Universal distrust creates universal incompetency."
Id. at 1001-02 (citing Van Itallie v. Franklin Lakes, 146 A.2d 111 (1958)).
20. See Tenafly, 704 A.2d at 1032.
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disqualifying conflict of interest. In relying on the Local Govern-
ment Ethics Law,21 the court found that "potential for psychologi-
cal influences" existed because his mother needed the income
derived from her property to subsist. In addition, the value of her
property would definitely be influenced by the board's decision.22
Although the supermarket applicant argued that this conflict of in-
terest should not nullify the granted approvals based upon equity,23
the court found no authority allowing them to ignore a conflict of
interest based upon equitable factors.24
C. Conflicts of Interest Based Upon Alleged Political Pressure
Political pressure may also be cited as a disqualifying conflict of
interest. In one 1998 New Jersey case, the applicant alleged that all
of the zoning board members had a conflict of interest when the
township attorney appeared before them to oppose the applica-
tion.25 The alleged conflict, the applicant argued, was that zoning
board members are appointed by the township council, who also
directed the attorney to appear before the zoning board. The New
Jersey court applied the four-part test articulated in Wyzykowski v.
Rizas,26 concluding that no conflict existed when the township at-
21. This statute reads:
No local government officer or employee shall act in his official capacity in
any matter where he, a member of his immediate family, or a business or-
ganization in which he has an interest, has a direct or indirect financial or
personal involvement that might reasonably be expected to impair his objec-
tivity or independence of judgment.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:9-22-5d (West 1991)
22. See Tenafly, 704 A.2d at 1038.
23. See id. at 1039. A&P argued that the nullification remedy was harsh because
1) they were not made aware of the alleged conflict of interest until almost three
weeks after they had been granted approval; 2) the Grand Union and other objectors
had not raised the allegation of the conflict; 3) the issue was raised for the first time
by Care in its appeal to the governing body; and 4) they (A&P) had already spent $1.2
million in approval costs. See id.
24. See id. at 1040. The court concluded by stating,
Protecting the public interest in the integrity of the quasi-judicial process is
the key. Applying estoppel when the objectors have made a timely chal-
lenge to the approvals diminishes that protection. The purpose of the con-
flict of interest statute is "prophylaxis against misconduct and its effect can
be exerted fully only if it is applied without discrimination where
applicable."
Id. (quoting Zell v. Borough of Roseland, 125 A.2d 890 (App. Div. 1956)).
25. See Paruszewski v. Township of Elsinboro, 711 A.2d 273 (1998).
26. 626 A.2d 406 (1993). The following four circumstances will constitute a con-
flict of interest:
(1) "Direct pecuniary interests," when an official votes on a matter benefit-
ing the official's own property or affording a direct financial gain; (2) "Indi-
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torney appeared on behalf of the public, not himself, and when the
township committee had no authority to review the decision of the
zoning board."
D. Conflicts of Interest for the Attorney/Public Official
Attorneys must also be careful to avoid conflicts of interest when
they concurrently hold a public office and maintain a private law
practice. A 1998 Maryland case illustrates one type of conflict that
may arise when an attorney serves as a member of the county plan-
ning and zoning commission while representing clients on real es-
tate matters in the county.28 In this case, the attorney represented
clients who had business before the county. During the course of
the representation, the attorney-commissioner recused himself
from the public proceedings when his client's request first came to
the commission.29 After the commission approved the initial re-
quest, the attorney-commissioner proceeded to represent his cli-
ents in the next phase of their land development project by
preparing and filing an application with another public department,
not the county commission. Two weeks later, the attorney-commis-
sioner participated in a discussion at a county commission meeting
regarding proposed amendments to his client's plans, moving and
voting for the approval of the plan.30 According to the court, it was
the latter two acts that constituted a violation of the county ethics
law. While the attorney argued that the application to another de-
partment did not violate the conflicts of interest provision in the
local law,3' the court held that these applications may sometimes
rect pecuniary interests," when an official votes on a matter that financially
benefits one closely tied to the official, such as an employer, or family mem-
ber; (3) "Direct personal interest," when an official votes on a matter that
benefits a blood relative or a close friend in a non-financial way, but a matter
of great importance ... ; and (4) "Indirect Personal Interest," when an offi-
cial votes on a matter in which an individual's judgment may be affected
because of membership in some organization and a desire to help that or-
ganization further its policies.
Id. (citing Michael A. Pane, Conflict of Interest: Sometimes a Confusing Maze, 2 N.J.
MUNICIPALITIEs 8-9 (March 1980)).
27. See Paruszewski, 711 A.2d at 273.
28. See Carroll County Ethics Comm'n v. Lennon, 703 A.2d 1338 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1998).
29. See id. at 1340. Specifically, the clients needed to extend water service to their
property, an issue to be decided by the County Commission.
30. See id.
31. See id. at 1346. The relevant provision of the Carroll County Ethics Ordinance
states that county officials and employees who are subject to this ordinance shall not:
be employed by a business entity that; has or is negotiating a contract of
more than $3,500 with the County or is regulated by their agency; except as
1398
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be referred to the county commission for action, and while that was
not the case in the present situation, the event's mere possibility
was enough to satisfy the conflict of interest standard. The attor-
ney's participation at the last county commission meeting also vio-
lated the ethics law because his clients were regulated by the
commission of which their attorney was a member.32
IH. Compatibility of Office
Individuals must also be careful while concurrently holding pub-
lic offices that affiliation with one office does not constitute a con-
flict with one's duties to the other. In 1998, the Arkansas Attorney
General, among others, presented poignant commentary on poten-
tial problems with an individual's dual role.
A. Incompatible Offices
The Arkansas Attorney General opined that although nothing in
state statutes specifically prohibited a member of a county quorum
court from serving on the county planning board, the dual appoint-
ment should constitute an "incompatibility of office" as it would
under the common law.33  In reaching this conclusion, the Attor-
ney General noted that the two positions are incompatible based
upon their respective statutory powers and functions.34
B. Offices Found Compatible
In other 1998 commentary, the Arkansas Attorney General con-
cluded that although there is no inherent conflict of interest for an
acting city attorney to also serve as chairman of the city's zoning
exempted by this Commission pursuant to Section 6 of this ordinance[ ]...
[or] hold any outside employment relationship that would impair
impartiality.
Id.
32. See id. at 1348.
33. The Attorney General stated that two positions are incompatible when "there
is a conflict of interest" or "where one office is subordinate to the other." 98 Op. Ark.
Att'y Gen. 226 (1998) (citing Byrd v. State, 402 S.W.2d 121 (1966)).
34. See id. The Attorney General points out that "A majority of the quorum court
must approve creation of the planning board, and the quorum court must confirm
appointments to the board." Id. In addition, "[m]embers of the planning board are
subject to removal upon recommendation by the county judge and confirmation by
the quorum court." Id. Additional statutory reasons were cited including the quorum
court's authority to accept, modify or reject the board's recommendation or to initiate
its own planning and zoning laws, and the procedures for adoption of the official
plans. See id.
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commission, the potential for incompatibility existed. Finding no
constitutional, statutory or common law prohibition against hold-
ing dual office, the Attorney General warned that if a conflict ever
arose between the two positions, the attorney-chairman may have
to recuse himself or herself from involvement in either role.36
Throughout 1998, officials from other states also presented simi-
lar opinions on this topic. For example, the New York Attorney
General opined that the dual positions of planning board director
and member of the county industrial development agency ("IDA")
were compatible because one was not subordinate to the other, and
after a review of the job description for planning board director
and the functions of the IDA,37 there appeared to be no conflict of
duties.38
Case law from 1998 also presents evidence that holders of dual
public offices are not always precluded from such service based
upon incompatibility. In a Connecticut case brought by abutting
property owners challenging the zoning commission's granting of
subdivision approval, the plaintiffs claimed that one of the commis-
sion members held a salaried municipal office, thereby precluding
his participation in the matter.39 By statute, the zoning commission
in Connecticut is to consist of five people who hold no salaried
municipal office. 4° The presiding court, however, found that the
commission member was not a salaried employee, 41 and held that
because the subject applications were unanimously approved by all
six voting members of the commission, his participation did not re-
quire the court to invalidate the subdivision approvals.42
35. See id. In analyzing the common law surrounding compatibility of office, the
Attorney General concluded that the two positions at issue did not present a situation
where one was subordinate to the other. See id.
36. See id. The Attorney General also noted, "In the event of a case-specific con-
flict ... the city attorney should, as always, be cognizant of the various provisions of
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct for attorneys, concerning conflicts of inter-
est." Id.
37. See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 858 (McKinney 1986).
38. See 98 Inf. Op. N.Y. Att'y Gen. 45 (1998); N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 856(4).
39. See Smith v. Deep River Planning and Zoning Comm'n, No. CIV.A.96-80581,
1998 WL 345399 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1998).
40. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-19 (1989).
41. Oddly, the court stated, "Even if this court were to determine that he is, in
fact, a salaried municipal officer, this court cannot conclude that his minimal partici-
pation constituted 'material prejudice . . . ."' Id. at 4.
42. See id. The court stated "his presence and vote will not invalidate the result
and further that a majority vote need not be invalidated where the interest of a mem-
ber is general or of a minor character." Id. (quoting Murach v. Planning & Zoning
Comm'n, 491 A.2d 1058 (1985)).
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IV. Bias and Allegations of Prejudgment
Bias and prejudgment are issues that also may disqualify individ-
uals from making land-use decisions. These allegations, however,
are often difficult to prove. For example, a 1998 Connecticut court
found that two zoning board members were not required to recuse
themselves from participating in the plaintiff's appeal because the
plaintiff failed to meet the burden of proving bias or prejudice on
the part of the board members,43 although one of the board mem-
bers was a police officer who was responsible for having the plain-
tiff's car towed, and the other board member had erroneously
instructed the plaintiff that a fee was required to appeal the orders
of the zoning enforcement officer and further misinformed the
plaintiff to post a sign on the property at issue, notifying the public
of the appeal."a The court, however, found little or no opportunity
for the board members to exercise any bias against the plaintiff.
The court reasoned that both members had been subject to cross
examination by the plaintiff, had plausible explanations for the
contested meeting with the plaintiff and had little discretion in this
matter.45
In another 1998 Connecticut case, where a board member ques-
tioned throughout the lengthy proceedings whether the proposed
activities were permitted under the local regulations, the presiding
court found these expressions did not rise to the level of bias or
prejudgment necessitating disqualification.46 The fact that a board
member may have taken a tentative position on a matter does not
prove predetermination of the subsequent questions nor commit-
ment to denial of the application. Rather, the court urged future
plaintiffs to produce more tangible evidence of bias, but found
none here.47
43. See A & M Towing & Recovery, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, No.CIV.A.97-
0568209, 1998 WL 516158 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1995) (citing Rado v. Bd. of Education,
583 A.2d 102 (1990)). The presumption of impartiality attaches to administrative de-
terminations, and the burden is on the party seeking disqualification to prove
otherwise.
44. See id. At various times during the pendency of the action before the zoning
board, both board members had resolved to recuse themselves, but then later decided
to participate in some of the proceedings.
45. See id.
46. "The law does not require that members of zoning commissions must have no
opinion concerning the proposed development of their communities. It would be
strange, indeed, if this were true." Phillips v. Town of Salem Planning & Zoning
Comm'n, No. 113120, 1998 WL 258332 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1998) (quoting Furtney v.
Zoning Comm'n, 271 A.2d 319, 323 (Conn. 1970).
47. See id
1999] 1401
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Oftentimes, allegations of prejudgment arise when a pre-elected
land-use official makes campaign statements that arguably reflect a
position relevant to a subsequent application. In 1998, for exam-
ple, where two planning board members actively supported a new
supermarket for the township during their pre-application cam-
paign as candidates for the township committee, the presiding
court found insufficient evidence to indicate that the members
prejudged the application before them, stating, "[e]xpression in
support of a general proposition during a prior political campaign
does not invalidate a subsequent decision by the campaigners act-
ing in their official capacity as planning board members."48
Comments made by officials also become ammunition for oppo-
nents of board actions in a 1998 New Mexico case concerning the
siting of a shelter for abused and homeless youth. Opponents of
the project challenged the decision of the city council to annex the
tract of land and to establish special-use zoning for the property to
allow for the proposed shelter. The opponents alleged, based on
statements a member of the council made, that the member was
biased in favor of youth issues such as these and that she prejudged
the matter,49 creating an appearance of impropriety and abolishing
any chance for the petitioner to receive a fair and impartial hearing
during the process.5" Although the court noted Siesta Hill's asser-
tion that "a public officer sitting in a quasi-judicial capacity is nor-
mally disqualified if an objective observer would entertain
reasonable questions about the judge's impartiality,"'" it believed
the petitioner presented no evidence that the Councilor had
prejudged the matter, finding that the statements were, in fact,
made after the counselor heard the petitioner's arguments.52 In
finding no conflict of interest and no appearance of impropriety,
the court further stated that council members need not be so insu-
48. Lincoln Heights Ass'n v. Township of Cranford Planning Bd., 714 A.2d 995,
1004 (1998).
49. See Siesta Hills Neighborhood Ass'n v. City of Albuquerque, 954 P.2d 102
(1998). The petitioner cited to comments made by the Councilor that the issue was
"real cut-and-dried" and that she would "always vote in favor of youth issues." In
addition, the Councilor's children had attended a seven-week program run by the
agency requesting the zoning change. See id. at 108-09.
50. See id. at 108.
51. Id. at 109 (quoting High Ridge Hinkle Joint Venture v. City of Albuquerque,
888 P.2d 475, 486 (1994)).
52. See id. The Court also noted that members of administrative tribunals are
entitled to hold views on policy matters, even if they may be relevant to the case
before the board. See id.
1402
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lated from their community to the point that they must be de-
tached from every issue that comes before them.53
V. Miscellaneous
Several miscellaneous issues arose relating to land-use ethical
situations in 1998.
A. Who is the Client of the Government Lawyer?
Determining "who is the client" of a government lawyer is not
an easy task.54 Often, one may conclude that the client is the body
that retains the attorney, and it is to this body where the duties
owed by a lawyer to his/her client attach. Therefore, it is no sur-
prise to see bitter battles between executive and legislative
branches of local government who desire their own independent
legal counsel.55
A 1998 Pennsylvania court clarified that a zoning board itself,
not the borough solicitor, has the statutory authority to retain legal
counsel for the board.56 The court stated:
[t]he fact that counsel for a zoning board must be an attorney
other than a municipal solicitor underscores the importance of
permitting the board to select and employ its own legal repre-
sentation. Very often, conflict-of-interest considerations arise
where the governing authority of the municipality and the zon-
53. See id.
54. See REPORT OF THE D.C. BAR SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT LAW-
YERS (1988); Schnapper, Legal Ethics and the Government Lawyer, 32 REC. 649; Fed.
Bar Ass'n Prof'l Ethics Comm. Op. 73-1, 32 FED. B.J. 71 (1973).
55. The disputes arise when the chief elected official claims that the corporation
counsel or municipal attorney represent the municipality as a whole, obviating the
need for the legislative branch to retain their own counsel. This argument is further
polarized and made to be political when the counsel is hired and fired by the chief
elected official, not by the legislative body, and further, where the legislative body
needs executive budget approval to retain their own counsel.
56. See Zoning Hearing Bd. v. City Council, 720 A.2d 166 (1998). The court easily
distinguished this case from Borough of Blawnox Council v. Olszewski, 477 A.2d 1322
(1984), finding that Blawnox involved board members retaining unauthorized in-
dependent counsel for their own personal goals, and hence was an ultra vires act. See
id. at 167. Furthermore, the court relied on the Pennsylvania Municipal Planning
Code that provides, in part:
the governing body shall make provision in its budget and appropriate funds
for the operation of the zoning hearing board .... The zoning hearing board
may employ or contract for and fix the compensation of legal counsel, as the
need arises. The legal counsel shall be an attorney other than the municipal
solicitor.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 § 10617.3 (West 1997).
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ing board, have a different opinion, and the municipality is
forced to appeal the zoning board's decision. 7
Planning and zoning boards in rural municipalities often face the
greatest hardship in securing legal representation from a fiscal per-
spective. In 1998, although the Ohio Attorney General was mind-
ful of, and sympathetic to, this circumstance, 8 she commented that
a county prosecuting attorney may not provide official representa-
tion to a township board of zoning appeals 9.5  Reasoning that there
was no statutory duty for the county prosecutor to perform this
function, the Attorney General said that the prosecutor may not
assume the task voluntarily, "thereby devoting public resources to
a function not delegated to the prosecutor by statute."60 The "con-
flict of interest" issue was raised in the context that the prosecuting
attorney could be called upon to serve as counsel in a matter where
a legal duty of representation exists that could conflict with a rep-
resentation assumed for a board that is, in fact, not empowered to
call upon the attorney for representation.61
B. Resignation of Local Position As Part of
State Ethics Agreement
An interesting agreement was reached between the New York
State Ethics Commission and a state employee in 1998 that re-
quired the employee to resign his seat on a local planning board, in
addition to paying a fine, for receiving compensation in a private
engineering practice and appearing on behalf of clients before state
agencies.62 The agreement raises a unique question because the
State Ethics Commission's jurisdiction is limited to state employees
and activities relating to their state employment. Although the re-
57. Zoning Hearing Board, 720 A.2d at 168.
58. The Ohio Attorney General stated specifically:
You have stated that requiring the local boards of zoning appeals to hire
outside counsel when a decision is appealed to common pleas court could
present a financial hardship .... While we are sympathetic to your expressed
concerns, this is a matter that cannot be resolved by means of an Attorney
General opinion but, instead, must be addressed directly by the General
Assembly.
98 Op. Ohio Att'y Gen. 025 (1998).
59. See id.
60. Id. Members of planning and zoning boards are not township officers since
they are elected and not appointed. See id. (citing OHIO CONST. art. X, § 2). Also,
Ohio county prosecuting attorneys are under a duty to provide representation to
township officers. See id. (citing 92 Op. Ohio Att'y Gen. 080 (1992)).
61. See 98 Op. Ohio Att'y Gen. 025.
62. See In re Cukrovany (Disposition Agreement Jan. 20, 1998) (on file with New
York State Ethics Comm'n, Albany, N.Y.).
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signing individual was employed by the State Department of Envi-
ronmental Conservation, it is not apparent from the discussion in
the published agreement why the State Ethics Commission or the
Department should be concerned with his membership on a local
planning board. The situation begs the question whether state em-
ployees working for agencies involved in some aspect of the land-
use planning or regulatory process should serve on local planning
and zoning boards at all.
.C. Appearances by a Governing Body of a Municipality
Before a Zoning Board
Generally, members of planning and zoning boards are ap-
pointed by either the chief elected official of a municipality, by a
local legislative body or by a combination thereof. Therefore, ap-
plicants before the zoning board may believe that the municipal
legislative body or the chief elected official is exerting undue influ-
ence or pressure over the zoning board with respect to a particular
application. The suspicion of influence is especially strong where
the municipal attorney appears before the zoning board to oppose
an application on behalf of the local government. Such was the
case in a 1998 New Jersey decision in which the applicant sought a
certification that his airstrip was a valid non-conforming use.63 The
township committee directed the town attorney to appear before
the zoning board to oppose the application and to present evidence
that the use was not a valid pre-existing, non-conforming use. 64
The presiding court concluded that the governing body had stand-
ing to oppose the application and that the appearance before the
zoning board did not present a reversible conflict of interest. The
court reasoned that the governing body had no power to review the
zoning board's determination, that a professional planner engaged
by the township had concluded that the proposed use would be
contrary to the public interest and a detriment to the township and
that, in appropriate cases, the appearance of the township's attor-
ney on behalf of the municipality, "provides a means by which the
63. See Paruszkewski v. Township of Elsinboro, 711 A.2d 273 (1998).
64. See id. at 275. The court noted that the Municipal Land-Use Law provides
direct authority in at least two situations for a township to appear before a zoning
board: 1) when the development of municipal property is at issue; and 2) when an
application involves land situated within 200 feet of municipally owned land. See N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-12 (West 1998).
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public interest is represented in proceedings of substantial public
importance. "65
Conclusion
The foregoing cases illustrate that legal and municipal ethics in
land-use planning continue to play a pivotal role in challenges to
land-use decision-making. The examples provided also serve to re-
mind municipal attorneys of the critical need for the continued ed-
ucation of municipal officials and the municipal bar concerning
these important ethical considerations. It is the continued educa-
tion, as well as stringent regulation by the judicial system with re-
spect to occurrences of conflict of interest, incompatibility of office
and bias, that will ensure land-use officials are faithfully serving
their communities (and not themselves) when making zoning and
planning decisions.
65. Id. at 279 (quoting Township of Berkeley Heights v. Bd. Of Adjustment, 365
A.2d 237, 238 (1976)).
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